DO U.S. MARKETING ORDERS HAVE MUCH MARKET POWER? AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALMOND BOARD OF CALIFORNIA

This paper tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit-maximizing cartels. The paper analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry on the world market, and the legal authority of the almond marketing order makes it a likely prospect for exhibiting true cartel behavior. The authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California's reserve setting is significantly less than would be expected from a profit-maximizing cartel.Marketing,

Import demand of Bananas in the European Union

The EU banana market has been of enormous interest for researchers for a long time, especially after the import policy unification brought by the Common Market Organization for Bananas (CMOB) in 1993. Empirical evidence suggests that the CMOB and its subsequent modifications have been highly distorting. However, the quantifications made of those distortions by different authors vary a lot, not only in magnitude but also in direction. The reason is that for each evaluation, a different system of demand equations has been estimated. However, besides the different models used, there is one common denominator to all models. They do not incorporate the general restrictions (homogeneity, symmetry and adding up) necessary to make the demand estimations consistent with economic theory. In this paper we estimate the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) to calculate more reliable elasticities to facilitate future welfare analysis of the EU banana market. The inverse almost ideal demand system (IAIDS) was also estimated under the alternative assumption that import prices adjust to quantities instead to quantities adjusting to price variations as it has usually assumed. However, the results are not reported because due to the upcoming import policy and its subsequent quota elimination, quantities will not longer be predetermined. Preliminary results show that demand elasticities are different depending on the region of origin of the imported bananas. Latin American bananas are substitutes of bananas from preferred suppliers and complements of others while imports from the ACP are substitutes of all regions. EU bananas behave similar to Latin American in the sense that they are substitutes of all by other suppliers. Preliminary welfare analysis of the proposed policy shows that both Latin American producers and EU consumers of Latin American bananas will lost from the quota elimination and increase in the tariff level.International Relations/Trade,

Learning from 20 Years of Payments for Ecosystem Services in Costa Rica

Costa Rica's Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES) programme has become something of an icon in the world of conservation. Its innovative blend of economic and regulatory instruments - and its hitches and successes - provide a valuable source of inspiration for other countries that are looking for effective ways to conserve and regenerate ecosystems. Since 1997, nearly one million hectares of forest in Costa Rica have been part of the PES programme at one time or another, and forest cover has now returned to over 50 per cent of the country's land area, from a low of just 20 per cent in the 1980s. What lessons can be learnt from the 20 years since it was founded? Also published in Spanish, this paper is for local practitioners, international researchers and donors who are interested in the Costa Rican experience

DO U.S. MARKETING ORDERS HAVE MUCH MARKET POWER? AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALMOND BOARD OF CALIFORNIA

This paper tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit-maximizing cartels. The paper analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry on the world market, and the legal authority of the almond marketing order makes it a likely prospect for exhibiting true cartel behavior. The authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California's reserve setting is significantly less than would be expected from a profit-maximizing cartel

Import demand of Bananas in the European Union

The EU banana market has been of enormous interest for researchers for a long time, especially after the import policy unification brought by the Common Market Organization for Bananas (CMOB) in 1993. Empirical evidence suggests that the CMOB and its subsequent modifications have been highly distorting. However, the quantifications made of those distortions by different authors vary a lot, not only in magnitude but also in direction. The reason is that for each evaluation, a different system of demand equations has been estimated. However, besides the different models used, there is one common denominator to all models. They do not incorporate the general restrictions (homogeneity, symmetry and adding up) necessary to make the demand estimations consistent with economic theory. In this paper we estimate the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) to calculate more reliable elasticities to facilitate future welfare analysis of the EU banana market. The inverse almost ideal demand system (IAIDS) was also estimated under the alternative assumption that import prices adjust to quantities instead to quantities adjusting to price variations as it has usually assumed. However, the results are not reported because due to the upcoming import policy and its subsequent quota elimination, quantities will not longer be predetermined. Preliminary results show that demand elasticities are different depending on the region of origin of the imported bananas. Latin American bananas are substitutes of bananas from preferred suppliers and complements of others while imports from the ACP are substitutes of all regions. EU bananas behave similar to Latin American in the sense that they are substitutes of all by other suppliers. Preliminary welfare analysis of the proposed policy shows that both Latin American producers and EU consumers of Latin American bananas will lost from the quota elimination and increase in the tariff level

The Motivation for Organic Grain Farming in the United States: Profits, Lifestyle, or the Environment?

The objective of this research is to identify and quantify the motivations for organic grain farming in the United States. Survey data of US organic grain producers were used in regression models to find the statistical determinants of three motivations for organic grain production, including profit maximization, environmental stewardship, and an organic lifestyle. Results provide evidence that many organic grain producers had more than a single motivation and that younger farmers are more likely to be motivated by environmental and lifestyle goals than older farmers. Organic grain producers exhibited a diversity of motivations, including profit and stewardship

Payments for ecosystem services as a policy mix: Demonstrating the institutional analysis and development framework on conservation policy instruments

Policy mix analysis has been applied in research on energy, climate, urban and transport policy, and more recently biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services. However, policy mix analysis has thus far been employed at a high conceptual level, focusing on describing interactions between instrument types. Policy mix analysis rarely describes instrument 'structure' or functional characteristics in a way that would answer the question 'what constitutes an instrument'? We describe how the rules-in-use taxonomy of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, developed for research on common pool resource management, can be used to characterize conservation policy instrument interactions. We demonstrate the approach on the well-known payments for ecosystem services (PES) program in Costa Rica and cross-compliance policies, arguing that PES is a policy mix rather than a single economic instrument. Our analysis shows how design features of PES described in the economics literature map to 'rules-in-use' in the IAD framework. The framework provides a terminology for defining what constitutes institutional context, comparing economic, regulatory and information instruments, and studying their interactions. The rules-in-use taxonomy of IAD is a 'structural' diagnostic approach, which needs to be combined with other tools that analyse the role and 'agency' of actors, as part of integrative environmental governance research. (Résumé d'auteur